The concepts of M-convex functions and M^-convex functions play central roles in the theory of discrete convex analysis which has been applied to mathematical economics. On the other hand, substitutability, which is a key property guaranteeing the existence of a stable matching in generalized stable marriage models, is known as a nice property in mathematical economics. In this paper, we introduce new properties, which are extensions of substitutability, and present new characterizations of M^-convex set functions by these properties.
Introduction
Discrete convex analysis, proposed by Murota [ll, 121 , is a unified framework of discrete optimization (see [13, 141 for details) . The concepts of M-convex functions due to Murota [I 1, 121 and M^-convex functions due to Murota and Shioura [15] are considered as a backbone in discrete convex analysis, and have close relations to nice properties in mathematical economics, called the gross substitutability and the single improvement property. Under the gross substitutability, Kelso and Crawford [9] proposed a matching model with money and showed the nonemptiness of the core of their model. The single improvement property was first introduced by Gul and Stacchetti [8] , and the equivalence between these two properties was verified for set functions by them. Furthermore, the equivalence between the single improvement property and M^-concavity for set functions was shown by Fujishige and Yang [7] . Relations among these three properties are extended to the general case by Danilov, Koshevoy and Lang [2] and by Murota and Tamura [16] . This guarantees that an M^-concave function has nice features as a utility function from the point of view of mathematical economics. In fact, several economic models utilizing M^-concave utility functions have been proposed. Danilov, Koshevoy and Murota [3] showed the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisible commodities when the utility function of each agent is quasilinear in money and its reservation value function is Mbconcave. Murota and Tamura [17] proposed an efficient algorithm for finding a competitive equilibrium of the Danilov-Koshevoy-Murota model. B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann and Nisan [lo] discussed a combinatorial auction with M^-concave utilities. Eguchi and Fujishige [4] extended the stable marriage model to the framework of discrete convex analysis. Fujishige and Tamura [6] proposed a common generalization of the stable marriage model and the Fleiner [5] , who defined "substitutability" in distinct manners and showed the existence of stable matchings of their models.
In this paper, we define two properties as variations of "substitutability." Let V be a nonempty finite set, and Z and R be the sets of integers and reals, respectively. We denote (SC1) For any zl, z2 E Zv such that 21 > 2 2 and argmin{/(y) 1 y < z2} # 0, if x1 E arg min{ f (y) 1 y <^ zl}, then there exists x2 such that (SC2) For any 21, 22 Zv such that z1 2 2 2 and arg min{/(y) 1 y < zl} # 0, if x2 E arg min{ f (y) \ y < Q} , then there exists xl such that These properties are interpreted as follows. Here, we assume that V denotes the set of indivisible commodities, x E zV the numbers x(v) of commodities v produced by a producer and f a cost function of the producer. (SC1) says that when the producible quota of each commodity decreases or remains the same, the producer wants a production such that the numbers of the commodities whose quotas remain the same do not decrease. (SC2) says that when each quota increases or remains the same, the producer wants a production such that the numbers of the commodities which fail to fill the original quotas do not increase. If f is a set function (i.e., is defined on the hypercube {O, I}' ) then (SC1) and (SC2) are equivalent to conditions of substitutability in Sotomayor [19, Definition 41 , and if arg min always gives a singleton (in this case (SC1) and (SC2) coincide) then these are equivalent to persistence (substitutability) in Alkan and Gale [I] . In the model in [4] and the restricted version of that in [6] , the concave-versions1 of (SC1) and (SC2) are key properties certifying the existence of a stable matching, because M^-convexity implies (SC1) and (SC2) (see Lemma 3.1 in Section 3). The model in [4] can be recognized as a concrete example (in terms of utility functions) of the models in [l, 5,18,19] (in terms of choice functions with "substitutability").
This work is motivated by the above recent results on generalized stable marriage models with M^-concavity or substitutability. Our aim is to investigate relations between M^-convexity and substitutability. This paper gives two examples showing the independence between (SC1) and (SC2), and furthermore, introduces two strengthened properties (SCL) and (SC;) of (SC1) and (SC2). Our main contribution is to show the equivalence among (SCL), (SC;) and M^-convexity for set functions.
Concave-versions are obtained by replacing "arg min" with "arg max."
Mi-Convexity
In this section, we review some definitions and known results about M^-convex functions. 
New Characterizations of Mi-Convexity
In this section, we give two strengthened properties (SCA) and (SC;) of (SC1) and (SC2) and present new characterizations of Mh-convexity for set functions by these new properties.
Before defining (SCL) and (SCg), we give examples showing the independence between (SC1) and (SC2). We can easily check that f satisfies (SC1). However, it does not satisfy (SC2) f o r z\ = (1,l) and 2:2 = ( 0 , l ) . and z2 = ( 0 , l ) . Fujishige and Tamura [6] have shown that ~h-convex functions satisfy (SC1) and (SC2) (for self-cont ainment , we give a proof of their assert ion). Here we show that f satisfies (SC1). Similarly we can show that it satisfies (SC2).
Let XI E argmin{/(y) 1 y <, zl}. We choose xi e argmin{f(y) 1 y <, z2} such that it minimizes ~{ x l ( w )
Assume to the contrary that W e can check that f satisfies both (SC1) and (SC2), but not (M'-EXC) for x = (1,1,0) and
From the above discussion, we must consider stronger properties than (SC1) and (SC2) to characterize M^-convexity. For this, we introduce the following two properties of a function f : Zv - The lemma below shows that (SCL) and (SC;) are equivalent to each other for set functions. 
